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Abstract 
Does homeownership affect individual social capital and thereby influence local outcomes? 
Following DiPasquale and Glaeser, a body of literature suggests that homeownership is 
positively related to social capital formation. Homeowners have an incentive to engage in the 
local community in order to preserve or enhance the value of their housing asset. Moreover, 
homeownership creates barriers to geographic mobility, which increases the present value of the 
expected stream of benefits from local community social capital. We test the homeownership 
hypothesis alongside other individual, household and locational determinants of social capital 
using unique data created by merging the 2006 and 2008 samples of the New Zealand Quality of 
Life survey. The measures of social capital used in our analysis include trust in others, 
participation in social networks, attitude towards local governance and sense of community. 
Since homeownership is not randomly assigned, we complement our regression models with 
propensity score matching to control for selection effects. The results confirm that 
homeownership exerts considerable positive impact in the formation of social capital in New 
Zealand communities. In raising accountability of local government it does, however, lead to 
reduced satisfaction by homeowners in the performance of local councils. 
JEL codes 
H54, R11, Z13 
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 1. Introduction 
Homeownership has increasingly attracted the attention of socio-economic researchers 
as well as policy makers as interest in the impacts that such investment has on outcomes for 
nations, regions and individuals increases. Recent studies have attempted to measure whether 
there are non-conventional benefits to homeownership, such as improved outcomes for children 
(Mohantly and Raut, 2009; Haurin et al., 2002), for immigrants (Sinnings, 2010), crime (Sampson 
et al., 2007), labour markets (e.g., Borjas, 1985; Oswald, 1996) and general wellbeing (Cobb-Clark 
and Hildebrand, 2006). Many of these benefits relate to community interaction. The theory 
behind this relationship  is that when someone purchases a home and becomes the owner-
occupier, this financial investment also reduces geographical and labour  mobility  due to 
transactions costs. This provides an increased incentive for an individual or family to invest in 
their community, through engagement in local decision making as well as through interactions 
with other members of the community (networks) and through participation in community 
activities (DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser et al, 2002; Earls et al., 1997). 
In contrast to the argument for the benefits of home ownership, there exist in the 
literature arguments which suggest that high home ownership may be related to negative 
outcomes. These arguments stem primarily from papers by Oswald (1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999), 
who argues that homeownership increases unemployment through reduced geographic and 
labour mobility caused by increased transaction costs. In contrast, authors such as Boehm and 
Schlottmann (1999) focus on the benefits of that reduced mobility, arguing that this increases 
neighbourhood quality and stability and that it also encourages socio-political activity in the local 
community. However, it is generally agreed by both proponents and critics of homeownership 
that homeowners have a greater incentive to invest in the local community than private or state 
landlords. It is through this mechanism that it is argued that homeowners attain higher stocks of 
social capital. 
The concept of social capital has become increasingly popular since it was introduced 
into economics by Putnam (1993),  who related community interaction as well as civic 
engagement to local government performance in Italian regions. Putnam’s arguments brought 
social capital – which before then had been primarily a theoretical concept used by sociologists 
in the fields of education (e.g., Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988, 1990) – into the mainstream and 
provided the impetus for a range of theoretical and statistical investigations. While social capital 
as a concept has encountered some criticism (e.g., Arrow, 1999; Solow, 1997, 1999), empirical 
findings have consistently shown that  measures of social capital are linked to improved 2 
 
individual, local and national outcomes. However, while the effects of social capital have been 
well documented, there remains a deficit in the theory and evidence regarding the causes of 
social capital formation (Glaeser, 2001). 
In this paper we seek to investigate the effects of homeownership on social capital by 
testing a model of local social capital using a range of dependent and explanatory measures 
obtained by merging two samples (2006 and 2008) of New Zealand’s Quality of Life (QoL) 
survey. We combine this dataset with regional data from Statistics New Zealand. 
We hypothesise  that homeowners will attain larger stocks of social capital through 
investment in their local community due to the increased incentives they face as a result of the 
transactions costs of moving. We test this hypothesis using both regression and propensity score 
matching to estimate the effect of homeownership on several proxies for social capital. 
This analysis aims to both complement and contribute to the existing body of literature 
on the micro foundations of social capital. The role of homeownership is examined using micro-
level regression analysis on a range of proxies for social capital. When trying to establish a causal 
link from homeownership to social capital, we must take  into  account that, unlike in a 
randomised  trial, there are certain selection mechanisms that draw households into 
homeownership, including the local level of social capital. Thus, we use propensity score 
matching to quantify the “treatment effect” (homeownership) on the “treated” (homeowners). 
This approach has been used to identify causal effects in other micro-econometric studies (e.g., 
Angrist and Pischke, 2009), but to our knowledge this paper is its first application to estimating 
the impact of homeownership on social capital.  
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses the general theoretical framework 
for the analysis of the determinants of social capital held by individuals and the methodology 
used for the analysis. Section 3 examines the underlying methodology used in the analysis, 
including a detailed description of the propensity score matching procedure. Section 4 reviews 
our data and provides summary statistics while Section 5 reports the empirical results of both the 
regression and PSM analyses. The final section presents the conclusions and suggests avenues for 
further research. 
2. Analytical Framework 
In conducting this analysis, we adopt a definition of social capital provided by Westlund 
(2006), who describes social capital as “Social networks which are created, maintained and used 
by the network participants in order to distribute norms, values, preferences, information and 3 
 
social attributes” (p. 8). As such, social capital can be thought of as the linkages between actors 
by which information flows. 
The underlying stock of individual social capital, being the sum and strength of the 
linkages in an individual’s network,  is  both  intangible and unobservable. This has forced 
researchers to look for suitable alternative measures in order to estimate social capital stocks at 
various levels. The result has been the adoption of a wide range of proxy variables where a 
theoretical link exists between that variable and the underlying stock of social capital. In this 
paper, we utilise  four proxies for social capital in developed democratic  societies: trust, 
participation, sense of community, and attitudes towards local government.  
Both interpersonal trust and community participation are commonly used measures of 
the stock of social capital, primarily due to their inclusion in both the World Values Survey and 
the General Social Survey. These surveys are conducted in many nations throughout the world 
and researchers such as Zak and Knack (2001) have provided robust theoretical links which 
validate their use. Higher levels of trust relate to increased ease in establishing linkages with 
others, while participation in community activities facilitates the formation and strengthening of 
linkages.  
Measures of a sense of community and attitudes towards local government bodies are less 
commonly applied as proxies for social capital. The rationale for their inclusion stems from the 
work of Putnam (1993, 1995) which suggested that social capital is,  in part,  expressed in 
community interaction. Using Putnam’s theory, we assume that individuals who had a positive 
sense of community would be more engaged in that community, and therefore experience 
greater social capital through stronger network linkages. Both Putnam and DiPasquale and 
Glaeser (1999) propose that individuals with high levels of social capital will also be more fully 
engaged in local political processes. One result of this is that they are likely to hold their local 
council more fully to account. This may make them feel more or less positive towards their 
council than non-homeowners, depending on council performance. Indeed, to the extent that 
council services benefit all residents while property taxes (rates) are paid directly only by property 
owners, it is quite likely – given this theory – that homeowners will have a less favourable 
attitude towards local government than renters.  
Based on the literature, four distinct groupings of determinants of social capital have 
been identified for inclusion in an econometric model. They are: (i) demographic variables, (ii) 
geography and location-specific variables, (iii) variables relating to human capital, and (iv) a 
measure of homeownership.  4 
 
(i) Demography.  
Of an individual’s demographic characteristics, a person’s age and gender appear to be 
consistently associated with social capital (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2002; Putnam, 2000; van Emmerik, 
2006). Additionally, ethnicity matters too. In New Zealand, the framework for analysis of social 
capital developed by Statistics New Zealand (Spellerberg, 2001), as well as the work of Williams 
and Robinson (2001), suggest that analysis of social capital in New Zealand needs to take 
account of differences between various ethnic groups, particularly Māori (New Zealand’s 
indigenous people), as there are cultural differences in social beliefs and attitudes which may 
influence social capital formation.  
(ii) Geography.  
Geography and location have also been identified as important issues. Several European studies 
have shown social capital formation in rural settings to be significantly different from that of 
urban social capital, with more “bonding” rather than “bridging” social capital in evidence. This 
effect can be examined using population density as a proxy for urbanisation, with higher 
population densities reflecting more urbanised areas. There may also be unobserved differences 
between locations that can be controlled for using fixed effects estimation.  
(iii) Human Capital. 
 Human capital has been consistently found to be related to social capital (e.g. Huang et al., 2009; 
Glaeser et al., 2002; Helliwell and Putnam, 2007). As with much of the writing on social capital, 
the exact relationship is under some debate. Amongst others, Bowles and Gintis (2001) argue 
that social skills are a product of education, and as such, social capital could be considered a 
subcomponent of human capital. This is in contrast to the standard approach which is to view 
social capital as related to, but separate from, human capital. As the connection between social 
capital and human capital is one of the most robust and consistent findings in the social capital 
literature, inclusion of measures of individual human capital are included in our model. 
(iv) Homeownership.  
As outlined above, homeownership has been shown inter alia by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) 
and Glaeser et al. (2001) to have a significantly positive effect on variables relating to social 
capital. However, homeownership is not randomly assigned. It is likely that those who own their 
homes are also likely to have higher incomes, to have higher educational attainment, to be older, 
and to have a partner to share the mortgage with. These selection effects may cause bias in the 
estimates as those who own homes are likely also to be those who possess other characteristics 
commonly associated with social capital; therefore the effect of owning the home on social 
capital may be overstated. Among those who do not own homes, there may be differences in 5 
 
contributions to social capital between those who live rent free in a home owned by family, those 
who rent from a private landlord, and those who rent from a public landlord. 
In summary, assuming that individual i’s social capital (KSi) is determined  by that 
individual’s personal characteristics (Pi), the geographic variables of the individual’s region, r, 
(Gir), human capital (KHi), and homeownership status (HOi), we can specify a framework for the 
regression model as follows: 
(1)  KSi = K(Pi,KHi,Gir,HOi) 
This framework can be used to aid the selection of variables from available micro datasets. The 
exact form of the model will depend on both availability of data and the form in which the data 
is available.  
3. Methodology 
When participants in a study are not randomly assigned into control and treatment 
groups, we do not have an experimental setting to separate the causal effects of a treatment (in 
this case homeownership) from the selection effects which may arise. A number of options can 
be considered to estimate the effect of an intervention on a dependent variable. One approach to 
dealing with  selection bias is to  use a standard non-experimental estimator such as OLS 
regression and control for as many other influences as possible. A second method is to use a 
matching methodology in order to control explicitly  for potential selection bias. The latter 
method is preferred in this case given that homeownership is not randomly assigned. 
3.1.  Regression Analysis 
We report the results of OLS regression of the association between homeownership and 
the four proxies for social capital. We include controls for demography (age, gender, ethnicity, 
and household size and composition), human capital (years of schooling, employment status and 
income), and geography (years resident in the region). Our equation also includes both spatial 
and time fixed effects (but not individual fixed effects since we do not have longitudinal data on 
individuals). The resulting estimation can be shown as: 
(2)  KSirt = α + β0 HOirt + Xirt β + Rr + Dt + εirt 
where KSirt is the outcome of interest, in this case the proxy for social capital, of individual i in 
region r at time t, HOirt is a dummy representing the treatment, in this case whether the individual 
is a homeowner or not, Xirt are the observations for individual i in region r at time t on a set of 6 
 
explanatory and control variables pertaining to geography, demography and human capital while 
Rr and Dt are the coefficients for the spatial and time fixed effects respectively.  
We estimate the regression model in equation (2) for each of the four social capital 
proxies: trust, participation, community and council. As trust is a binary variable, we used a logit 
model in this case. Due to truncation of the values that the participation index can exhibit, this 
proxy was analyzed using a tobit regression. As community is an ordinal Likert-scale type of 
variable (with a higher score representing a ‘better’ outcome), an ordered logit regression is 
appropriate. The council variable was created by taking the first principal component of three 
binary variables relating to an individual’s attitude towards local government.  The resulting 
variable has a normal distribution with zero mean and 1.25 standard deviation, so (ignoring 
selection issues) ordinary least squares regression is appropriate.  
A major concern with cross-sectional regressions is that omission of unobservables in 
relation to individuals may bias coefficients in regressions of a social capital proxy on a set of 
observable explanatory variables. Furthermore, omission of unobservables makes interpretation 
of causality problematic.  These problems can be substantially mitigated where: (a) there are 
multiple proxies for social capital; (b) one of the proxies is theoretically related to exogenous 
personal characteristics; and (c) that proxy is not a function of the explanatory variable of 
interest for determining another form of social capital. If (c) does not hold, one can still use a 
proxy that meets condition (b) to test the robustness of results. 
As a particular example, take two social capital proxies: trust  and  participation.  The 
psychological literature on attachment theory (Bowlby 1982) indicates that early life experience 
affects subsequent personal relationships throughout life, including the likelihood that an 
individual will generally trust others. Thus there is an unobserved personal element to trust that 
is additional to the impact of societal factors such as ethnicity, age, geographical location, et 
cetera. A longitudinal regression can control for such factors using fixed effects, but this is not 
possible with a cross-section regression. However, we can make use of the unobservable 
component affecting trust in order to control for individual unobservables in a regression of the 
determinants of participation. 
To see how we can do so, consider the following system of equations representing the 
structural relationships between the variables: 
(3)  TRUSTi     = βXi + αHOMEi + μi 
(4)  PARTICIPTIONi   = γXi + δHOMEi + φμi + εi 7 
 
where: i refers to an individual; Xi is a variable (or vector of variables) affecting both TRUSTi 
and PARTICIPATIONi; HOMEi is homeownership status; μi reflects unobservable personal 
characteristics; εi is a random error term;
1
If the individual unobservables (μi) that contribute to high trust are positively correlated 
with HOMEi, then estimation of (4), with μi excluded, will result in omitted variables bias with 
an over-estimate of the effect of HOMEi on PARTICIPATIONi. From equation (4): 
 TRUSTi and PARTICIPATIONi are defined as before; 
and (consistent with our subsequent results) each of α, δ, φ >0.  
μi   = TRUSTi - βXi - αHOMEi 
Thus:   
PARTICIPATIONi   = γXi + δ HOMEi + φ(TRUSTi - βXi - αHOMEi) + εi 
Hence: 
(5)  PARTICIPATIONi   = (γ-φβ)Xi + (δ-φα)HOME i + φTRUSTi + εi 
Equation (5) shows that by including TRUST in the PARTICIPATION equation we can 
control for individual unobservables, μi, (at least those unobservables affecting TRUST). We can 
no longer interpret the coefficients on Xi structurally (unless we also have the β coefficients) but 
given that our interest is in δ, this is not a major concern. If α=0 (so that homeownership does 
not affect TRUST) then we can interpret δ structurally as the effect of homeownership on 
PARTICIPATION  after controlling for both  observable  (Xi)  and  unobservable  (μi) 
characteristics  of  individuals.  If  α>0  then,  by  including  TRUST  in  the  equation  for 
PARTICIPATION, the coefficient on HOME in (6) will now provide an under-estimate of 
HOME on PARTICIPATION.  
Following this logic, we estimate the impact of homeownership on participation, 
community and council in two ways. The first omits trust in the regression, while the second 
includes TRUSTi  as an explanatory variable. The two resulting estimates of the HOMEi 
coefficient provide bounds for the impact of homeownership on three of the social capital 
proxies, variously controlling for (not controlling for) individual unobservables that impact on an 
individual’s level of personal trust. In both sets of equations, we also include a self-reported 
variable that measures the respondent’s belief in the importance of community; this variable also 
assists in controlling for otherwise unobservable character traits of the individual. 
 
                                                 
1 We could add another random error term to (1), separate from μi, but this complicates the exposition without 
adding insight. 8 
 
3.2.  Propensity Score Matching Methods 
An alternative to regression estimation is to use a quasi-experimental method in the form 
of propensity score matching (PSM) in order to compare individuals who are observationally 
similar except with respect to the treatment. In a randomised experiment, the randomization 
procedure itself would ensure that a sufficiently large control and treatment group would be on 
average observationally similar, as well as having on average the same unobserved attributes 
(Bryson et al., 2002). A quasi-experimental design differs from an experimental design because in 
the former the data have not been generated by a random assignment of individuals into the 
treatment or control group. The estimation process for the treatment effect needs to take into 
account that there may be underlying reasons why individuals are likely to fall into the treatment 
or control group. Several quasi-experimental methods have been developed (see Greenstone and 
Gayer, 2009). Most require longitudinal data on an individual to measure before and after 
treatment outcomes while taking into account heterogeneity in the population in terms of 
unobserved personal attributes. Given the data available for this study, we can only account for 
selection on observables, and matching methods are then the best option for controlling for 
selection bias. 
Matching methods involve the process of matching observations in a treatment and 
control group based on observed characteristics such that we compare two or more individuals 
who are observationally similar but happen to belong to either one or the other group. The result 
is that we gain an estimate of the effect of the treatment while removing the underlying bias that 
self-selection into the treatment group (on the basis of observables) may have caused.  
The specific technique of PSM was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), who 
proposed that matching individuals on a set of observable characteristics would reduce the bias 
present in observational studies which lacked randomisation.
2
                                                 
2 Our application of PSM is estimated using PSCORE for Stata (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
 PSM takes a set of characteristics 
shared by both treatment and control groups, and creates a single-index variable rather than 
having a large matrix which would be difficult to match on. The propensity score can then be 
used to match observations such that those with a similar propensity score possess similar 
characteristics. While this may not completely remove the selection bias, it provides improved 
estimation through the reduction in bias resulting from having matched individuals. Propensity 
score matching requires individuals who have  the same propensity score to have the same 
likelihood of being selected for the treatment group.  9 
 
To our knowledge, the present paper is the first PSM  evaluation of the effects of 
homeownership on individual social capital. However, other applications of the methodology are 
widespread. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) suggest that for PSM to successfully reduce selection 
bias, observations for both treatment and control groups must be at the same location (and date) 
and have used the same questionnaire. The dataset must contain a rich set of variables which are 
relevant to both the intervention (homeownership) and the outcome (social capital). The results 
of the PSM are calculated by taking a researcher-specified list of variables which reflect the 
characteristics of observations within a sample and must relate not only to the treatment but also 
to the dependent variable. Using these variables, the method generates an index score which 
represents the characteristics of the individual. PSM requires scores to be balanced between 
treatment and control groups in terms of their representation within propensity score blocks. 
The balancing refers to the idea that exposure to the treatment effect is random for any given 
propensity score. Therefore, treated and controlled observations should be,  on average, 
observationally identical (Becker and Ichino, 2002). This does not require control and treatment 
groups to be equal, but rather to have means which are not significantly different given the 
variables they are matched on. The balancing property is satisfied by dividing the propensity 
scores into ‘blocks’ and testing to see whether the control and treatment groups within each 
block are on average identical. Further discussion and formal proofs can be found in Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1993), Imbens (2000), or Becker and Ichino (2002). 
Once propensity scores are obtained, there are several different methods of matching in 
order to  obtain treatment effects. They include stratification, nearest neighbour, radius and 
kernel matching. Each method matches treatment and control groups based on their propensity 
score, using different matching criteria.  
The stratification method divides the propensity scores into ranges such that within each 
range, treatment and control groups have the same PSM score on average, essentially the same as 
the blocks used for balancing the PSM scores. The average treatment effect is then calculated by 
taking the average effect from each block and weighting it by the number of treated 
observations.  
The nearest neighbour  matching  method  compares treated observations with 
observations that have not been treated but that are observationally the nearest. The pair-wise 
difference between the outcomes of the treated and their non-treated  neighbours is then 
calculated and the average difference reported. However, it is possible that with nearest 
neighbour and stratified methods, observations in the treated group or the control group will be 10 
 
compared with very different observations from the opposite group in terms of propensity 
scores.  
To overcome this problem, both radius and kernel matching methods can be 
implemented. Radius matching is similar to nearest neighbour  matching, but matched 
observations are constrained to be within a given proximity to each other. Kernel matching 
compares the treated with weighted averages of all those in the control group, where the weights 
are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of the treated and the 
controls.  
For the purposes of our analysis, both nearest neighbour and kernel matching algorithms 
were used. We provide two sets of estimates. The first uses the treatment of whether or not an 
individual owns the home they live in, while the second compares homeowners to private renters 
only. The dependent variables are the three proxies for social capital specified earlier, with trust 
included as one of the variables on which individuals are matched. Balanced blocks for 
homeownership have been obtained using variables relating to trust;  com_imp,  which is a 
measure of how important the individual believes it is to feel a sense of community;  age; 
ethnicity; education; income; employment status;  relationship status; and regional population 
density, which acts as a proxy for the regional fixed effects. 
4. Data Overview and Descriptive Statistics 
We use pooled cross-sectional micro data obtained by merging the 2006 and 2008 
samples of the New Zealand Quality of Life (QoL) survey. The QoL survey is unique to New 
Zealand and is a national survey sponsored by local government, with data available on request 
from the Quality of Life Research Team after approval of a formal proposal.
  3
Four QoL surveys have been completed to date (in 2003 and then biennially from 2004). 
However, due to changes in the questionnaire and coding only the 2006 and 2008 surveys were  
 The survey is 
designed with the aim of measuring aspects relating to an individual’s quality of life, living 
situation, community interactions, and aspects of health and wellbeing, in order to assist local 
government decision making and provide insight into regional issues, particularly for people 
living in urban areas. 
selected for our analysis. The merged dataset has a sample size of 15,700, with 7,545 participants 
in the 2006 survey and 8,155 in the 2008 survey. Surveying was conducted using computer 
assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) and the sample was drawn from New Zealand residents 
                                                 
3 See http://www.bigcities.govt.nz/contacts.htm 11 
 
aged 15 and over, with quotas for age, gender and ethnicity. Our final sample was restricted to 
those over 18 at the time of the survey. Participants were drawn at random from the electoral 
roll and were notified by mail prior to the phone interview. The final response rates were 22% in 
2006 and 37% in 2008. Because actual levels of social capital are not directly observable, we 
require suitable proxy variables which represent individual social capital. As noted earlier, we 
were able to construct four proxy measures of social capital, namely: trust in others, participation 
in social networks, sense of community, and attitude towards local governance.  
In addition to the data available through the quality of life survey, data regarding the 
regional demographics for New Zealand were obtained from the Statistics New Zealand 2006 
Census of Populations and Dwellings. A full list of the variables obtained through these datasets 
using the framework specified earlier is presented in Appendix 1. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the final variables reported in the regression 
equations, from which a subset is used in the propensity score matching. These statistics suggest 
that the combined and cleaned dataset was largely representative of the underlying general New 
Zealand population. Regarding gender, males were slightly under-represented, as 48% of the 
New Zealand population over 18 are male compared to 44% in the sample. The age distribution 
was fairly consistent with the New Zealand distribution; however there was an under sample of 
those aged 20 to 29 and 75 to 84, particularly amongst women. Those aged 45 to 49 were the 
only group largely overrepresented in the sample, however women aged 50 to 64 sixty-four were 
also slightly oversampled. Dealing with ethnicity is problematic in New Zealand following the 
introduction within many surveys of a new ethnic category, ‘New Zealander’, in addition to the 
traditional European and Māori and other ethnic groups. Our prior is that this group should be 
combined with ‘European’ and ‘Pakeha’
  4
                                                 
4 Māori term for people of European descent. 
  to form a single group, European, and when we 
compare the ethnic distribution we use this assumption. We find the pooled dataset to be almost 
perfectly representative of the underlying ethnic distribution of New Zealand, primarily due to 
the survey methods of the QoL survey. The sample is not particularly representative of the 
underlying geographical distribution between New Zealand’s regions. Rural regions are 
consistently undersampled, and while New Zealand’s major city, Auckland, appears to be 
accurately represented, there is a strong oversample in the urban and peri-urban regions around 
Wellington,  the capital city, with 21% of the sample coming from Wellington and the 
surrounding regions compared to 9% of the population. The regions of the South Island are also 
under-represented, with 18% of the sample residing in the South Island compared to 25.5% of  12 
 
 
Table 1: Means and Percentages of Variables used in Multivariate Analysis 
Variable  Full sample  Homeowners   Family housing   Private Renters   State housing  
N  15,056  10,861  1,930  1,734  531 
Dependent var.           
participation  2.87  2.85  3.12  2.77  2.67 
community  3.62  3.69  3.39  3.39  3.71 
council  0.00  -0.05  0.14  0.09  0.34 
trust  0.77  0.79  0.73  0.74  0.70 
Explanatory var.           
com_imp  0.70  0.73  0.62  0.63  0.74 
male  0.44  0.43  0.51  0.43  0.41 
age  46.25  51.02  27.28  37.73  45.52 
foreign  0.24  0.24  0.29  0.23  0.26 
maori  0.13  0.11  0.15  0.19  0.30 
pacific  0.05  0.03  0.12  0.07  0.19 
asian  0.08  0.06  0.16  0.13  0.04 
other  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.05 
education  13.46  13.53  13.16  13.60  12.54 
income q2  0.32  0.30  0.37  0.34  0.45 
income q3  0.27  0.28  0.23  0.30  0.23 
income q4  0.27  0.31  0.09  0.20  0.11 
part-time  0.21  0.19  0.29  0.21  0.23 
unemployed  0.15  0.12  0.24  0.21  0.28 
retired  0.11  0.14  0.02  0.03  0.12 
hhsize  3.12  2.95  3.94  3.23  3.31 
children  0.52  0.55  0.24  0.55  0.60 
partner  0.76  0.88  0.22  0.64  0.64 
reg0_10  1.44  1.34  1.22  2.25  1.48 
reg10+  0.71  0.74  0.76  0.46  0.68 
popdens  466.33  448.62  527.45  501.79  490.59 13 
 
the actual population. The regressions reported in section 5 are based on unweighted data, as 
appropriate weighting remains somewhat arbitrary and weights are not transferable to the PSM. 
Nevertheless, exploratory regressions weighted by age and location using census frequencies 
yielded very similar results. Our sample earned more than the underlying population, with each 
quartile above the first containing more than 25% of the observations in the pooled sample. 
Participants who indicated they were foreign born comprised 24.4% of the sample. This is close 
to the proportion of foreign born aged 18 and over in the New Zealand 2006 census, which was 
approximately 26%.  
In comparing the proxy variables for social capital for foreign and New Zealand born 
participants, foreign born participants were almost identical to New Zealand born participants in 
all measures with the exception of the attitudes towards local government. The index here was 
derived as the first principal component of three variables. Foreign Born participants scored a 
mean first component value of 0.038 compared to -0.012 for New Zealand born participants.  
In comparing the descriptive statistics across the four homeownership categories we note 
that males were over-represented in family housing and under-represented in state housing 
(relative to their sample proportion). All non-European ethnic groups are under-represented as 
homeowners. Those identifying as Māori and Pacific Islander were much more likely to be living 
in state housing than their share of the population would suggest, while those identifying as 
Asian were more likely to live in family accommodation. A high proportion of those in lower 
income quartiles are accommodated in state housing, while those in the top income quartile are 
under-represented in private rentals and very strongly under-represented in family housing and 
state housing. The family housing result is consistent with the low mean age of those in family 
housing, indicating that this category is likely to comprise a significant number of young adults 
still living with parents. 
5. Results 
To  examine the impact of homeownership on social capital, we first use standard 
regression techniques to estimate the model specified earlier using the four separate dependent 
variables. We then use PSM analysis to estimate the impact of homeownership on social capital. 
5.1.  Regression Results 
The determinants of each of the four separate dependent variables are estimated by 
means of regression methods that are appropriate to the type of dependent variable. We used a 
standardised model with a fixed set of explanatory variables chosen using the theoretical 14 
 
framework developed in section 3, with consideration of the available data introduced in section 
4. The variables are described in Appendix 1 and table 1. All variables are related to one of the 
four categories specified in the framework: either geographical, demographic, human capital or 
home ownership.  
The binary trust variable is examined using a logit regression, while the participation 
index is examined using tobit regression due to the truncation of the index. Sense of community 
was examined using ordered logit regression while the first principal component of the council 
variables is examined using ordinary least squares. In each regression, we control for both spatial 
(i.e. regional) and time fixed effects. As discussed in the methodology section, the variable trust 
may be used as a proxy for unobservable personal traits of an individual gained through early 
childhood. In order to utilise this information, we estimate each of the other three proxies for 
social capital using first the standardised model and secondly the model plus the variable “trust” 
to control for the influence of these unobservable character traits. Appendix 2 presents the full 
regression results. Table 2 presents the results pertaining just to the homeownership and trust 
variables. 
5.1.1.  Impact on Trust 
The results for the logit regression of trust can be seen in column (1) of table 2. We 
distinguish four categories of homeownership: owner-occupier, renting from a family member 
(or provided rent free), renting from a private landlord and renting from the state. The default 
category in the regression is owner-occupier. We find that those renting from a private landlord 
or from the state are significantly less trusting than homeowners (or those living with a family 
member). 
The results in Appendix 2 show that males, those with a partner, and people with higher 
education report higher trust, while people of Asian and Pacific ethnicity report lower levels of 
trust. These results are consistent with earlier research on the determinants of trust, using a 
different dataset, the World Values Survey (see Roskruge et al., 2011). Working part time was 
significantly related to higher trust. This variable also has a positive impact, where significant, on 
the other social capital variables of participation, sense of community, and attitudes towards local 
government. Being unemployed was also positively related to trust and sense of community. It is 
possible that these two variables pick up that lower, or zero, hours of work reflect a high 
reservation wage and greater productivity in the non-market sector, particularly given that 
unemployment was amongst the lowest in the OECD during this period, averaging 3.85% in 15 
 
 
Table 2. Unstandardized coefficients from regression models predicting outcomes of proxies for social capital. 
 
 
Notes: Time period and spatial fixed effects included; standard errors in parentheses; Significant at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; # Standard R-squared. Cut 
points for ordered logit 3a: -1.03, 0.92, 2.79, 4.99. 3b: -0.98, 0.98, 2.86, 5.06. Full regression model presented in appendix 2. 
  (1)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b) 
VARIABLES  Trust  Participation†  Participation††  Community  Community  Council  Council 
trust      0.287***    0.315***    0.260*** 
      (0.029)    (0.038)    (0.024) 
ho_fam  -0.058  -0.009  -0.007  -0.017  -0.019  0.156***  0.155*** 
  (0.083)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
ho_renter  -0.157**  -0.107**  -0.103**  -0.115**  -0.108**  0.121***  0.129*** 
  (0.067)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
ho_state  -0.289***  -0.240***  -0.216***  0.034  0.038  0.385***  0.409*** 
  (0.106)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.056)  (0.057) 
Observations  14,860  14,980  14,860  14,911  14,799  14,935  14,841 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0349  0.0304  0.0324  0.130  0.132  0.067#  0.075# 2006 and 4.175% in 2008. Non-participation and part-time paid work are associated with higher 
rates of voluntary work (for New Zealand, see e.g., Clark and Kim, 2009).  
5.1.2.  Impact on Participation 
Columns  (2a)  and (2b) in table 2 report  the results for the determinants of the 
participation index using a tobit regression  respectively excluding and including trust as an 
explanatory variable. The participation index ranged from 0 to 8, where zero had the participant 
engaged in no activities and 8 where the participant engaged in all activities surveyed in the QoL 
questionnaire.  The two models are very similar, indicating that controlling for individual 
unobservables (through the inclusion of trust) makes little difference to the results. The variable 
trust and believing in the importance of community are strong and significant predictors of 
increased participation.  
The  positive impact of homeownership  on social capital  is confirmed in each of 
regressions (2a) and (2b). Both renting from a private landlord and living in a state owned house 
yield a negative impact on social participation, significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively, 
relative to people who are homeowners (or renting from a family member). 
The effect of age is non-linear, with minimum participation in social activities at around 
age 50. This reflects the opportunity cost of time devoted to such activities. The typical concave 
age earnings profile suggests that this cost is indeed the highest around age 50. Māori, Pacific 
Islanders, and females reported higher levels of participation in social activities, consistent with 
those groups having on average lower hourly labour market earnings. However, those with Asian 
ethnicity participate less, as do those who were born overseas. This is possibly because many are 
recent immigrants who may be less integrated in New Zealand society.
5
5.1.3.  Impact on Sense of Community 
 The coefficient on the 
years of schooling is significant. There is also strong evidence that residing in a region longer 
than ten years is associated with increased participation. Plausibly, larger households participate 
more in social activities.  
Columns (3a) and (3b) in table 2 show the impact of homeownership and other factors 
on an individual’s sense of community. The two models are again consistent, with no changes in 
significance as a result of introducing the trust variable. Both trust and believing in the 
importance of community are significant and positive at the 1% level.  
                                                 
5 The results are consistent with those of Clark and Kim (2009). 17 
 
The relationships between homeownership status and this proxy for social capital are 
somewhat more complex than for the prior two proxies. Renting from a private landlord is 
associated with a lower sense of community than for homeowners (or those living with family), 
significant at the 5% level in each equation. However, there is no statistically significant 
difference between homeowners and people living in state owned housing. One of the purposes 
of state housing provision is to provide more deprived families with stable housing tenure, so 
providing a more stable community especially for children in these families (Murphy, 2003; 
Schrader, 2005); thus  many of these tenants  will have long-term  relationships with their 
community. This policy intention is reflected in the lack of significant difference in sense of 
community between homeowners and those with a state tenancy. 
Growing older raises the sense of community. This relationship is concave and reaches a 
maximum at the top end of the age range of the survey respondents. All ethnic minorities have a 
more  positive  sense of community than do Europeans,  reflecting  the strong networks that 
operate within such communities. Those who are retired, in part time employment, unemployed, 
and in larger households also report a greater sense of community. Moreover, as we might 
expect, there is an increase in the sense of community for additional years of living in a region. 
Interestingly, increased education had a significant negative impact on an individual’s sense of 
community. 
5.1.4.  Impact on Attitudes Towards Local Government 
Columns (4a) and (4b) present the results of the ordinary least squares regression model 
that  tests for factors influencing attitudes of residents towards the activities of their local 
government. The two models are again remarkably consistent, and both trust and community 
importance are significant at the 1% level.  
Each of the three housing measures (private renting, state renting, and living with family) 
is significant and positive at the 1% level when compared to homeowners. Thus homeowners 
have a more negative view of their local government’s performance than do non-owners. 
Homeownership in New Zealand brings with it the obligation to pay local property taxes. The 
cited work of DiPasquale and Glaeser finds that homeowners hold local politicians to account 
more stringently than do other residents. Together, these considerations indicate that 
homeowners feel they are not getting value for money (at least relative to the views of other 
residents) from their councils. Consistent with the homeownership result, the attitude towards 
the council significantly declines with increasing duration of residence. A longer stay in a region 18 
 
therefore  appears to make residents  even  less satisfied with the performance of their local 
council. 
The age coefficients indicate that the attitude towards council activities over the life cycle 
initially becomes more negative with age, and then becomes more positive after people have 
reached midlife. Pacific and Asian ethnic groups are more positive towards their local council 
than are other ethnicities, while more educated people also have a more positive attitude towards 
local government. The attitude is more positive in regions with greater population density (i.e., 
more urbanised regions).  
5.1.5.  Comparison of Homeownership Effects Across Models 
Comparing the models, we see that both trust (when it is included as an explanatory 
variable) and a stated belief in the importance of community are significant determinants of each 
of the other proxies for social capital. Thus our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for 
individual unobservables about a person’s underlying traits. Compared to home owners, those 
who rent from either a private or state landlord are significantly less likely to trust others or 
participate in social activities, and private renters are also less likely to feel a sense of community. 
However, when considering attitudes towards local government, those living in family, private 
rental, and state rental housing are all significantly more likely to have a positive attitude towards 
local government compared to those who own their own homes. This result may in part be due 
to the fact that local government rates and levies are paid for explicitly by home owners, while 
those who are renting have these costs incorporated into their rent, and therefore they do not 
face these costs directly. All residents, however, benefit from the services provided by local 
government. As homeowners are faced with a bill for local government services, they have a 
stronger incentive to hold local government to account and are therefore more critical of council 
actions. They may also experience an increased sense of “ownership” over the local council, and 
therefore demand better services. The positive coefficients for people who are not owner-
occupiers suggest that those groups are less actively involved in holding local authorities to 
account. 
In summary, the regression estimates show that homeownership has a significant positive 
effect on three of the proxies for social capital. An exception occurs with respect to attitudes to 
local government performance, where homeownership is associated with less positive attitudes, 





Table 3. ATT estimates using propensity score matching.  
 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 100 replications; one-tailed t statistic 
significant at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Matched on: trust, com_imp, age, age
2, 
maori, asian, other, log(education), income Q2, Q3 & Q4, fulltime, unemployed, partner 
and the log of regional population density. ATT is the average treatment effect for the 
treated (i.e. for homeowners relative to the reference category). 
 
5.2.  PSM estimates 
In this section we discuss the results of the PSM model of  the impacts of 
homeownership on the three proxies for social capital (i.e. excluding trust). We estimated the 
PSM model using homeownership as a treatment for two separate control groups. The first 
compared homeowners to all non-homeowners pooled, while the second compared them to 
private renters only. For each approach we used both kernel and nearest neighbour matching to 
estimate the effects with bootstrapped standard errors obtained with 100 repetitions. The results 
   N. Treated  N. Control  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Participation; homeowners versus non-homeowners 
Nearest Neighbour  10721  1956  0.138  0.061  2.25*** 
Kernel  10721  4123  0.136  0.044  3.06*** 
Community; homeowners versus non-homeowners 
Nearest Neighbour  10721  1946  -0.001  0.032  -0.03 
Kernel  10721  4123  0.042  0.032  1.34* 
Council; homeowners versus non-homeowners 
Nearest Neighbour  10721  1954  -0.195  0.048  -4.03*** 
Kernel  10721  4123  -0.205  0.040  -5.17*** 
Participation; homeowners versus private renters only 
Nearest Neighbour  10721  1301  0.222  0.070  3.17*** 
Kernel  10721  1710  0.133  0.049  2.73*** 
Community; homeowners versus private renters only 
Nearest Neighbour  10721  1296  0.027  0.050  0.53 
Kernel  10721  1710  0.093  0.034  2.70*** 
Council; homeowners versus private renters only 
Nearest Neighbour  10721  1300  -0.117  0.051  -2.29*** 
Kernel  10721  1710  -0.152  0.042  -3.57*** 20 
 
of each of the models for the three proxies are presented in table 3. To ensure balancing, we 
adopted a more parsimonious model than that used in the regression estimations. The matching 
model utilised the following variables: trust, belief in the importance of community, age, age
2, 
maori, asian, other, log(education), income from quartiles 2, 3 and 4, fulltime, unemployed, 
partner and the log of regional population density. Using this model we were able to balance the 
propensity scores for both homeowners versus non-homeowners and homeowners versus 
renters at the 0.01 level. Importantly, the inclusion of trust as a matching variable means that we 
are matching not just on standard observable characteristics of individuals but also on 
unobservable personal characteristics reflected in an individual’s trust in others. 
Figure 1 presents the kernel densities of the propensity scores for homeowners, non-
homeowners and renters using the control variables specified above. The figure suggests that 
while there is considerable overlap in the distributions, the kernel density for homeowners has 
considerable density for high propensity scores, with a strongly negative skew. The distribution 
for non-owners has one overlapping mode in the same range (between 0.8 and 0.95) but another 
mode between propensity scores of 0 and 0.2 while the distribution of private renters much 
more closely resembles that of homeowners. This is reflected in the very different means 
between the groups, with the mean propensity score for homeowners being 0.83, 0.7 for renters 
and 0.43 for all non-homeowners combined. We therefore place more emphasis on the results 
that compare homeowners just with private renters than with all non-homeowners combined. 
The estimates of the average treatment effect of homeownership on the treated (ATT) 
are reported in Table 3 for the three proxies of social capital, the two matching methods and the 
two comparator groups. When considering homeowners compared both to all non-homeowners 
and to private renters only, the effect of homeownership is positive and significant for 
participation. However, there is weaker evidence for homeownership impacting on the sense of 
community. For this social capital proxy, the treatment effect is not significant using nearest 
neighbour matching but is significant (at the 10% and 1% levels respectively) using kernel 
density matching for the two samples. Both matching methods and both samples provide clear 
evidence that homeowners have less positive attitudes towards local government than do other 







Figure 1: Kernel density estimate for homeowners, non-homeowners and private 
renters 
 
The average treatment effects provide us with some understanding of the likely effect 
that owning a home has on participation, sense of community,  and attitudes towards local 
government for observationally similar individuals, where similarity extends to their stated 
attitude towards trust in others. For participation, the interpretation is that the average number 
of social activities is 0.13 to 0.22 higher for homeowners than for non-owners. For the sense of 
community, even the statistically significant estimates show only a very small effect size. The 
findings for attitudes towards local government are strongly significant and negative  when 
compared to both all non-homeowners and renters only. The effect sizes are large considering 
that the variable council has a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 1.25. 
Across the PSM results, there is therefore considerable evidence showing an impact of 
homeownership on at least two of the proxies for social capital. Specifically, homeownership 
status impacts positively on participation in community activities and negatively on attitudes 
towards local government performance. These results are consistent with the prior OLS results. 
These results are obtained after controlling for both observable and unobservable individual 
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6. Conclusions 
By applying both regression and matching techniques to survey data collected in New 
Zealand, we  have  estimated the impacts of homeownership on  four separate proxies of 
individual social capital, after controlling for other observable and unobservable factors. 
Using regression methods, and controlling for a wide range of other individual, local and 
time characteristics, we find that when an individual owns the home they live in, they report 
significantly  higher levels of social capital than those who do  not  own their own  home. 
Specifically, they have higher trust in others, participate more in local activities, and have a more 
positive sense of community.  Homeowners have a less positive attitude towards local 
government performance than do people in other forms of housing tenure. Even here, this 
outcome likely reflects a stronger involvement in the governance of their community by 
homeowners, where this involvement makes them less satisfied with the performance of their 
local representatives. 
The PSM estimates of the average treatment effect of homeownership yield similar 
results. Homeowners participate in more social activities than non-homeowners. However, once 
like individuals are matched, there is weaker evidence that homeownership increases the sense of 
community an individual feels. Again, however, we find strong evidence that homeownership 
leads to a less positive attitude towards local government performance. 
 Both sets of results support the hypothesis that homeownership encourages personal 
investment in the local community. These results may have implications for policy, particularly 
for those areas where there are low levels of owner-occupied dwellings. In such areas, a range of 
social ‘bads’ may arise from lower levels of social capital associated with the lack of 
homeownership. The PSM results (on which we place most reliance) imply that increasing levels 
of homeownership improves  participation  in community activities, but  may  not engender a 
material increase in the sense of community. Thus whether or not homeownership should be 
encouraged depends on the outcome that is being sought. If a greater sense of community is 
desired, a policy favoring homeownership may have little effect. If policy-makers wish to 
increase participation in local activities, they may wish to consider policies that enhance 
homeownership. In addition, if central government wishes  to raise the incentives on local 
residents to hold local government to account, a policy that raises homeownership levels may be 
an effective means of engendering extra scrutiny of local government performance. 
Future work could expand on our homeownership definition to test whether single-
occupier dwellings are significantly different from couple, family or communally occupied 23 
 
dwellings. It could also be worthwhile to investigate the type of social capital which is formed 
through homeownership. This would be particularly interesting when considering the difference 
between bridging and bonding social capital and how that impacts new arrivals’ integration into a 
community. 
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*Indicates baseline variables, † indicates dependent variables. 























participation†  Index of activities individuals are an active participant in 
community†  Reported sense of community 
council†  Index of attitudes towards council 
trust†  0= “cannot be too careful” 1= “most people can be trusted” 














euro*  Identified as ethnic European 
maori  Identified as ethnic Maori 
pacific  Identified as ethnic Pacific Islander 
asian  Identified as ethnic Asian 
other  Identified as belonging to another ethnic group 
foreign  Not born in New Zealand 
male  0= female, 1=male 
age  Age in years 
hhsize  Size of household, truncated at 6. 
children  Child under 15 currently living in same residence 
















ho_owner*  Owner of household 
ho_fam  Living in home owned by family 
ho_renter  Living in privately rented accommodation 














  education  Years of formal schooling 
income q1-q4  Quartile of New Zealand income distribution 
fulltime*  1= currently in full time employment 
part-time  1= currently in part time employment 
unemployed  1= currently not in labour force 











  reg0_10  Number of years living in region, up to 10 
reg10+  0= less than 10yrs, 1= 10yrs+ 
popdens  Population per km2 in territory individual resides in 
Regional dummies  51 dummies created from 72 New Zealand territorial authorities.      
Appendix 2: Unstandardized Coefficients from Regression Models Predicting Outcomes of Proxies for Social Capital 
  (1)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b) 
VARIABLES  trust_net  participation†  participation††  Community  Community  Council  Council 
trust      0.287***    0.315***    0.260*** 
      (0.029)    (0.038)    (0.024) 
com_imp  0.316***  0.448***  0.432***  2.354***  2.340***  0.291***  0.275*** 
  (0.044)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
male  0.073*  -0.128***  -0.131***  -0.050  -0.053  0.037*  0.035 
  (0.043)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
age  0.014  -0.023***  -0.026***  0.029***  0.027***  -0.015***  -0.017*** 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
age2x100  -0.008  0.023***  0.025***  -0.014*  -0.013*  0.020***  0.022*** 
  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
foreign  -0.070  -0.118***  -0.114***  0.048  0.049  0.004  0.005 
  (0.057)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
maori  -0.002  0.294***  0.298***  0.333***  0.336***  0.019  0.017 
  (0.063)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
pacific  -0.179**  0.448***  0.461***  0.278***  0.303***  0.236***  0.245*** 
  (0.091)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
asian  -0.420***  -0.178***  -0.164***  0.179***  0.200***  0.245***  0.263*** 
  (0.083)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.044)  (0.043) 30 
 
other  0.037  0.036  0.035  0.137*  0.137*  0.061  0.059 
  (0.105)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
ln(education)  1.474***  1.608***  1.555***  -0.203**  -0.254***  0.351***  0.293*** 
  (0.128)  (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
income q2  -0.043  -0.025  -0.026  0.039  0.041  0.044  0.045 
  (0.067)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
income q3  -0.025  -0.005  -0.005  0.078  0.073  0.032  0.030 
  (0.078)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
income q4  0.068  0.059  0.050  0.059  0.054  0.081*  0.080* 
  (0.085)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
Part-time  0.249***  0.216***  0.203***  0.219***  0.208***  0.033  0.025 
  (0.063)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
unemployed  0.163**  -0.018  -0.034  0.211***  0.202***  0.045  0.040 
  (0.071)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
retired  0.060  -0.010  -0.012  0.293***  0.297***  -0.042  -0.051 
  (0.115)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
ho_fam  -0.058  -0.009  -0.007  -0.017  -0.019  0.156***  0.155*** 
  (0.083)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
ho_renter  -0.157**  -0.107**  -0.103**  -0.115**  -0.108**  0.121***  0.129*** 
  (0.067)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
ho_state  -0.289***  -0.240***  -0.216***  0.034  0.038  0.385***  0.409*** 
  (0.106)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.056)  (0.057) 31 
 
hhsize  0.055***  0.096***  0.090***  0.069***  0.066***  0.032***  0.030*** 
  (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
children  -0.072  -0.062**  -0.051*  -0.024  -0.017  -0.055**  -0.053** 
  (0.050)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
partner  0.133**  0.033  0.025  0.080*  0.075*  -0.044  -0.053* 
  (0.056)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
reg0_10  -0.025*  0.010  0.012  0.046***  0.047***  -0.017**  -0.015** 
  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
reg10+  -0.146*  0.188***  0.202***  0.342***  0.361***  -0.149***  -0.143*** 
  (0.088)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
constant  -3.517***  -1.699***  -1.689***  -1.032***  -0.980***  -1.331***  -1.313*** 
  (0.417)  (0.247)  (0.247)  (0.319)  (0.321)  (0.204)  (0.204) 
Observations  14,860  14,980  14,860  14,911  14,799  14,841  14,935 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0349  0.0304  0.0324  0.130  0.132  0.075  0.067 
Log likelihood  -7663  -26593  -26307  -18114  -17939  -23803  -24015 
Chi squared  553.7  1667  1760  5415  5445  N/A  N/A 
 
Notes: Time period and spatial fixed effects included; standard errors in parentheses; Significant at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Sigma is †1.460*** and 
††1.453*** and is equivalent to the standard error of estimate in OLS regression; # Standard R-squared. Cut points for ordered logit 3a: -1.03, 0.92, 2.79, 4.99. 3b: 
-0.98, 0.98, 2.86, 5.06. 
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